Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I

am grateful for the opportunity to appear before the committee.

I will not try to summarize the current scene with regard to

North Korea. I think Ambassador Davies did that quite well. I

would only say a few things as an opening.

First, this is obviously a very, very difficult problem, and it follows

that there are no good options for dealing with it. If there

were, I trust that some of us would have found those in the past.

Instead, I think what we have found is that North Korea, by and

large, has continued to exceed reasonable expectations as to what

they could accomplish technologically both in their missile program

and in their nuclear program. Having followed this issue for now

20 years, I would venture to say that they have consistently outperformed

the expectations of the outside world, and I do not think

we have time to get into the question of why. But they have created

a situation in which now they are demonstrably within reach

over some period of time of being able to, as someone put it earlier

today, mate a nuclear device with a missile, and that changes the

strategic balance in a number of ways.

As I said, the options for dealing with them are very limited and

very obscure. We can, as we have in the past at various times, simply

stand back and wait for what we considered at the time to be

the inevitable collapse. That policy has clearly not succeeded. We

began waiting for their collapse back in the late 1980s, and when

I last checked, they are still there.

Similarly, we can rely on a policy of containment and deterrence,

which we will have to do in any event. But I think what we have

found is that containment and deterrence do not prevent the threat

from growing more acute.

Also, we can, of course—as has been hinted in various questions

this morning—rely more heavily on China to somehow solve this

problem for us. I am not optimistic that China is going to do that.

I am encouraged by their apparent willingness to contemplate

tougher sanctions as they have this last time around in the United

Nations.

But I think China continues to face an essential conundrum

which is that while on the one hand, they do not want North Korea

to become a nuclear weapons state, on the other hand, they also

do not want North Korea to collapse. And in their view, they are

concerned that bringing sufficient pressure to bear on North Korea

to stop their nuclear program, much less to dismantle it, would risk

creating a situation in which North Korea could collapse. And for

China, an equally undesirable outcome of all of this would be to

wake up some morning and find that the border of South Korea is

now the Yellow River because North Korea has collapsed and

South Korea with a military alliance with the United States. That

changes in a very fundamental way what has been called the correlation

of forces on the Korean Peninsula. And Chinese strategic

thinkers have to have this very much in mind.

All this being said, my own personal view is that at some point—

I cannot say exactly when, but I would think sooner rather than

later—we will come back to an effort to engage with North Korea

in some manner only because the alternatives are so bleak. And I

think that that probably is what we should try to do because we

have no good options.

The question that will exist at that time is engage on what basis.

Do we again seek to engage on the basis of denuclearization pretty

much by itself at least as a primary objective, or do we seek to

engage on a broader basis going back, for example, to the joint

statement negotiated in the six-party process back in September

2005 in which all of the parties signed on to a four-goal/four-objective

formulation: denuclearization, a peace treaty to replace the

armistice of 1953, establishment of diplomatic relations among all

parties concerned, and agreement to provide energy and economic

assistance to North Korea.

In my view, it would be more productive to seek from the outset

to engage with North Korea on the basis of that broader agenda

which seeks, in my judgment, to get at what is really the fundamental

problem on the Korean Peninsula, the problem which gives

rise to the nuclear threat and that is the inherent weakness of

North Korea and the strong conviction of the North Korean regime

that it will not do anything which risks its demise.

So in my judgment, only by addressing these broader considerations

of a peace treaty to replace the armistice, economic and

energy assistance, and diplomatic relations do we have a prospect

of getting at what remains and will remain our central and abiding

concern which is the North Korean nuclear problem. But I think

rather than simply focusing on that and trying to identify it and

to try to resolve it in and of itself, which has not proven to be very

feasible over the last several years, I think we would be much better

off looking for a broader focus. And I think that the prior agreement

of September 2005 provides the seed for such a broader

agreement.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude my remarks.

It is easily disrupted. As we have seen,

North Korea’s adherence to any of these agreements is tenuous at

best, and they have to be continually reassured that they are not

giving up their one piece of negotiating leverage in return for

empty promises.

So I think it is very important, as we try to move forward, that

North Korea come away with some conviction that it is not just

denuclearization that we are going to make progress on. We are

also going to try to make progress on a peace treaty to replace the

armistice. And that I think is a very high priority from a North

Korean point of view, as well, of course, as the diplomatic relations

and economic assistance and energy assistance.

But please understand me. I am not saying that this is somehow

a magic solution to the problem, but it is the one piece that we still

have that they have agreed to and has constituted a foundation for

trying to move forward. And they have not disavowed it in that

sense.

Well, I suspect they took away lessons

from that that were inevitable and that are going to complicate our

policymaking with them for the foreseeable future. The most

obvious lesson would be if people think you have weapons of mass

destruction and then you take action to show that you do not have

weapons of mass destruction, this gives your adversaries room for

maneuver that they might not have had previously. And there are,

I think, legitimate reports that the North Koreans came away from

both Iraq and Libya with the conviction that if these two countries

had, in fact, had weapons of mass destruction, that what happened

to them would not have happened to them.

Well, I think China is concerned about

proliferation within the region.

No. It is one of several concerns. They

are also concerned about the stability of North Korea for the reasons

that we spoke of earlier. They are also concerned about the

nature of their relationship with the United States, and I think it

has been made quite clear to them that while North Korea policy

is not a pivot for that relationship, it is, nonetheless, very important

to that relationship. So they have very many points of interest

at play here.

And I think we sometimes make the mistake of thinking that

China is somehow a policy monolith in which problems are fed and

then solutions come out. One of the things that I came away from

my recent experience dealing with this problem—or convinced of—

is that the Chinese are of various minds about how to deal with

North Korea. There is no single view, and it is something that is

being very much debated and addressed within the policy circles of

North Korea, both within the government, within the party, and

within the so-called think-tank world. So they do not have a solution

to these concerns. They recognize the nature of the problem.

They recognize that it is something they have got to deal with, but

they also understand how complicated and how many different

points of interest in China are concerned about possible outcomes

in North Korea. That includes the party, the military, and the government.

Thank you.

Well, I would only add, Senator, that as

a longtime consumer of intelligence within the government, I have

been impressed on the one hand by how hard our intelligence community

works on North Korea, but I have also been impressed by

what a difficult target North Korea is. And I think their capacity

for surprise, while not limitless, is certainly greater than we might

expect.

I think we have to start with the realization

of the reality, which is that sanctions by themselves are not

going to solve this problem. Sanctions can make life even more difficult

for North Korea. Sanctions can force North Korea to contemplate

issues that they might not have contemplated without

them. But sanctions are not the solution to this problem. It is part

of the solution conceivably, but they are not the solution. Sanctions

have the effect of making us confident that we are at least doing

something, that we are not just sitting here passively and waiting

for divine intervention of this problem. We are taking some action,

but we should not, in my personal judgment, be under any illusions

that sanctions are going to solve this problem.